Notwithstanding the obvious differences in the strength of religion in Britain and the US, we will show that attitudes on many topics in this area are surprisingly similar in the two countries. One difference is inescapable, however. In the space of a few decades Islam has established a significant presence in Britain. The Muslim population reached 2.5 million by 2009 and is currently growing (through high fertility and immigration) at six per cent a year (Kerbaj, 2009) . This growth coincided with the militant form of identity politics that surfaced in 1989 in the form of book burnings and death threats against Salman Rushdie. Islamism, or political Islam, has re-emerged sporadically in violent form, notably in the London bombings of 7 th July 2005. By contrast the United States, where the total population is five times as large, has an estimated 1.3 million Muslims (Kosmin and Keysar, 2009) .
Just when religious divisions were fading into insignificance, these perceived threats to national identity and public order have propelled religion back to the forefront of communal concern. Social class, sex and race may be objectively more important, but religion -and particularly Islam -now appears to provoke more anxiety than these other traditional distinctions. Perhaps in reaction to these tensions, some young Muslims increasingly see religious commitment as a form of cultural assertion and self-defence. While it is plausible that ethnoreligious friction could also help to revive Christian identity, another possible outcome is hostility to religion in general, as promoted by authors such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens.
What follows is a comparative look at attitudes towards religion and religious issues in Britain and the United States. We explore two theses that seem contrary to accepted wisdom. The first is that many people in the two countries have similar views about religion. The second is that people in Britain are actually more concerned about religion than Americans -a result, we suggest, of disquiet about Muslim integration. Our starting point is an overview of religious identity, belief and practice in the two countries. We then look at the generally positive views people have about personal faith, and their more critical opinions about public religion. Evidence on the extent to which religion has come to be a source of social division follows, with particular attention paid to how negative views about particular ethnic groups are related to attitudes towards religion. In our final section we consider the rather limited tolerance that now exists for unpopular speech and displays of religious commitment.
Many of our findings derive from a series of questions about religion developed as part of the International Social Survey Programme. In Britain, these questions are asked as part of the British Social Attitudes survey; in the US they are included on the General Social Survey. 
Religious identity, belief and practice
Religious diversity has been a significant feature of British life since the Reformation. Catholicism never disappeared, nor were the established Churches of England and Scotland ever able to prevent dissent and competition. Jews have lived in Britain for centuries, though the rapid growth in the non-Christian population is largely the product of immigration since the Second World War. More and more people are ceasing to identify with a religion at all. Indeed, the key distinction in Britain now is between religious involvement and indifference. We are thus concerned about differences in religiosity (the degree of religious commitment) at least as much as diversity of religious identity.
Religious belief is a basic sign of commitment, and profession of faith is often taken as an essential element of what it is to be religious. Actual religious behaviour, especially attendance at services, may be an even stronger sign. Of course, some people attend for personal, family or social reasons, but in general, religious practice serves as a good indicator of religiosity. We start, however, with simple affiliation. Table 4 .1 shows the religious distribution of the population as measured by the question routinely included in the British Social Attitudes survey:
Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?
The fraction of respondents identifying themselves as Christian has fallen from two-thirds to a half since the British Social Attitudes survey series began in 1983 (Table 4 .1). Most of the shift has been to non-affiliation, with 43 per cent now willing to say that they do not regard themselves as belonging to a religion.
2 Muslims and other non-Christians make up the balance. Apart from a modest under-representation of Muslims (which official estimates put at four per cent rather than three per cent of the total population), the British Social Attitudes survey well reflects the current size of religious minorities. The declining Christian share is largely attributable to a drift away from the Church of England (C of E). While most of the growth has occurred in the "no religion" group, it is also noticeable that the Christian label (with no denomination specified) has become more popular in recent years. One might speculate that people who in the past might have given their identity as C of E are now inclined to describe themselves simply as Christian, thereby distinguishing themselves from Muslims and Hindus rather than from Catholics and Methodists. 'Ethnic nominalism', where religion is linked to ethno-national identity, may be gaining ground at the same time as religious practice is declining (Day, 2009) . Not all of these respondents are merely nominal Christians, however. Some will be active members of independent nondenominational churches, and indeed 25 per cent of them attend services at least monthly. The United States is certainly much more religious than Britain, but the common view that it is also more religiously diverse is debatable. The final column in Table 4 .1 shows findings from the American Religious Identification Survey 2008; 3 some three-quarters of the population align themselves with Christianity, and four per cent with a non-Christian group. 4 There is undoubtedly more variety within the broad Christian category in the United States, although denominations of every kind also exist in Britain. If, however, we consider our top level headings -no religion, Christianity, and other faithsthe British population is more evenly spread.
The differences between Britain and the United States are most apparent in the areas of belief and practice. To measure belief in God, respondents were asked to choose which of the statements in Table 4 .2 comes "closest to expressing what you believe about God". These judgements are likely to depend on the context; a degree of commitment that seems high in one place might be regarded as ordinary in another. But while self-ratings may not be useful for comparisons along an objective scale, the figures in Table 4 .3 do illustrate two important points. The first is that most people in both countries see themselves as moderate; half of Americans say that they are (merely) somewhat religious, while half of those in Britain either say the same or position themselves as neither one thing nor the other. The second point is that a quarter of the population in each country is willing to be more emphatic, but at opposite ends of the spectrum. For Americans, it is acceptable to be very or extremely religious, a stance taken by only seven per cent in Britain. By contrast, many people in Britain are comfortable describing themselves as very or extremely non-religious, compared with just nine per cent of Americans. 
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As As one might expect, the British pattern is heavily influenced by the large proportion of people who currently do not identify with any religion even though in many cases they were brought up in one. Nine in ten of this group never attend services (Table 4 .5). Non-Christians -and to some extent Catholics -follow the American pattern of observance. Among self-identified Anglicans, not even a fifth attend church as much as once a month, and half never go at all. There are substantial differences between the young and the old in religious identity, belief and practice. Previous research has shown that religious decline in Britain is generational; the gap between age groups arises not because individuals become more religiously committed as they get older, but because children are less religious than their parents. The results suggest that institutional religion in Britain now has a half-life of one generation, to borrow the terminology of radioactive decay. Two non-religious parents successfully transmit their lack of religion. Two religious parents have roughly a 50/50 chance of passing on the faith. One religious parent does only half as well as two together (Voas and Crockett, 2005) . Clearly, secularisation changes the environment in which children are raised and the likelihood of effective religious socialisation. How children are brought up has an enormous impact on their subsequent propensity to identify with a religion; once people reach adulthood their religious adherence is less likely to be affected by new conditions. What remains to be seen is how an environment that is increasingly diverse -in terms of both religion and religiosity -will affect the next generation.
Movement is not all in one direction, of course. The survey shows that 10 per cent of people in Britain who had no religious upbringing now regard themselves as belonging to a religion. Nor is the choice simply to stay or to go: nine per cent of respondents raised in one religion now identify with another. Nevertheless, the main shift is out of religion, something that characterises 36 per cent of people with a religious upbringing.
So far we have considered the three main measures of religious involvement: identity (or affiliation), belief (in God) and practice (specifically attendance at religious services). We can use these variables to classify people into one of three groups. We define people as 'religious' if they identify with a religion, believe (however tentatively) in God, and attend services (even if less than once a year). While this definition is exceptionally inclusive, it still covers only a quarter of people in Britain (see Table 4 .6). We will label people 'unreligious' if they do not regard themselves as belonging to a religion, do not believe and never attend. This fairly conservative definition captures not quite a third of the sample. In between we are left with a large group who could be called the 'fuzzy faithful' (Voas, 2009) : they identify with a religion, believe in God or attend services, but not all three. In what follows we will use these categories to look at the relationship between religiosity and attitudes. (The classification is far less useful for the United States, where more than two-thirds of people qualify as religious and the unreligious group is very small.)
Personal faith and religious authority
We turn now to perceptions of the role of religion in contemporary society. We begin with the personal advantages that religion is seen to offer to the faithful, and then consider attitudes towards the relationship between religion and public life, looking particularly at the extent to which people feel that religion should be influential in politics. We explore the sources of moral authority and conclude by examining attitudes towards faith schools.
There is a widespread view that religion is functional for both individuals and society. We asked respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:
Practising a religion helps people to… … find inner peace and happiness … make friends … gain comfort in times of trouble or sorrow
As shown in Table 4 .7, two-thirds of people agree that practising a religion helps people to find "inner peace and happiness"; few disagree (seven per cent). Religious Britons, like Americans, overwhelmingly back the statement. The idea that practising a religion helps people to make friends produces similar levels of support. The notion that religion is a comfort in times of trouble or sorrow is even more widely endorsed (not surprisingly, as critics of religion often describe it as a crutch). There is less consensus on the potential benefits of religion for society as a whole, although the principle receives support. We asked:
At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on British life or losing its influence?
And then:
All in all, do you think this is a good thing or a bad thing?
Half of the sample views the influence of religion on British life as positive (most saying that it is waning and that this is bad, the rest saying that it is increasing and that is good). Not quite a third regard religious influence as unfortunate -they approve its decline or regret its increase -and the remainder are uncertain about either the trend or how to evaluate it (Table 4 .8). People in Britain are, however, reluctant to see matters of faith intrude into the public sphere. As the proportion of the population that is religious has declined, the idea that religion should be a private matter has become ever more widely held (Bruce and Voas, 2007) . People appear happy to accept pronouncements from religious leaders on certain topics -notably excluding sexual behaviourprovided they are matters on which everyone tends to agree (Bruce and Glendinning, 2003) . Political life is a different matter, however. We asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:
Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions
Three-quarters (75 per cent) maintain that religious leaders should not try to influence voting behaviour while two-thirds (67 per cent) think religious leaders should stay out of government decision making. It is tempting to suppose that the situation is very different in the US, but in fact the figures there are almost identical (72 and 66 per cent respectively). This consensus has not inhibited religious leaders in either country from speaking on issues of political concern. The responses to the following question are therefore not too surprising:
If many more of our elected officials were deeply religious, do you think that the laws and policy decisions they make would probably be better or would probably be worse?
Nearly a half (45 per cent) of people in Britain take the view that laws and policy decisions would probably be worse in these circumstances, and only a quarter (26 per cent) think that decisions would probably be better. The example of Tony Blair and the war in Iraq was possibly influential for some respondents.
We also find only limited evidence that people in Britain see religion as a source of moral authority. Respondents were asked to pick which of these two statements came closest to their views:
In matters of right and wrong, some people say it is important to faithfully follow the leaders and teachings of one's religion Others say it is more important to follow one's own conscience
Only six per cent think that people should faithfully follow their religious leaders; 89 per cent take the alternative view. These attitudes do not merely reflect a reluctance to be told what to do; most people simply do not believe that there are absolute standards. Sixty per cent agree that "there can never be absolutely clear guidelines of what is good and evil"; the same proportion agrees that "morality is a personal matter and society should not force everyone to follow one standard".
Moral relativism is characteristic of modernity, but it is also thought to be an especially European phenomenon. Once again, however, the US is less different than one might expect. Three-quarters (74 per cent) of Americans take the view that morality is a "personal matter", and 80 per cent acknowledge that "right and wrong are not usually a simple matter of black and white; there are many shades of grey".
Perhaps because religion is seen by most in Britain as a private matter, people are unwilling to be challenged about their beliefs. We asked respondents to pick which of these statements came closest to their views: Some say it is okay for religious people to try to convert other people to their faith, others say that everyone should leave everyone else alone Only a sixth (17 per cent) of respondents think it acceptable for religious people to try and convert others; 81 per cent take the opposite view. There is also disquiet about the extent to which religious faith can lead to intolerance. Threequarters (73 per cent) of Britons maintain that "people with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others". Naturally, agreement was highest among the unreligious (at 82 per cent), but even 63 per cent of religious people concurred. Two-thirds (66 per cent) of Americans agree as well, so the statement represents a widely accepted view on both sides of the Atlantic.
Despite some scepticism about the extent to which religion can be a source of moral authority, state-supported church-linked schools continue to be a major feature of the educational landscape in Britain. To gauge people's attitudes towards faith schools we asked: Just over four in ten maintain that no religious group should have its own schools, and the same proportion thinks that that any religious group should have its own schools; the remainder would allow some groups but not others to have schools. As Table 4 .9 shows, around half of the unreligious oppose religious schooling, as do a little more than a quarter of religious respondents. Support for faith schools is strongest among Roman Catholics, who at secondary level are the major beneficiaries of the current system: 63 per cent would allow any religious group to run schools. Even so, 21 per cent of Catholics do not believe that there should be religious schools. 
Religion and social division
Social cohesion is influenced by attitudes towards diversity, of which religious diversity is an increasingly important component. The multicultural ideal is for difference to be seen as beneficial, and this ideological norm can indeed be found in countries like Australia and the US. If a degree of uniformity is seen as important for social cohesion, though, religious diversity may not be welcomed (Bouma and Ling, 2009 ).
Attitudes towards religious diversity
Religious diversity in the abstract receives a reasonable degree of support in Britain: 70 per cent of people -including 60 per cent of the unreligious -agree that "we must respect all religions". To press the matter further, we asked people how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement "religious diversity has been good for Britain". As Table 4 .10 shows, responses were mixed. Half of the country supports the assertion, but a majority of the unreligious disagree, as do more than a third of the religious. We will explore the possible reasons for these views later in this section. A similar level of ambivalence is apparent on the issue of whether all religious groups in Britain should have equal rights. As Table 4 .11 shows, barely half concur with the principle, with the remainder split between uncertainty and disagreement. Americans are considerably more supportive, as one might expect from the constitutional guarantee that the state will impartially protect all religions. The most telling results are produced when we ask people whether they agree or disagree that "Britain is deeply divided along religious lines". Just over half (52 per cent) agree with this view. Only 16 per cent disagree, with the remainder (28 per cent) neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement. Although some people agree that the country is divided even while supporting diversity (and vice versa), the perception that religion is a significant source of division is strong and probably fairly new. 
Diversity in practice?
When the issue is brought closer to home, most respondents claim to be comfortable with the prospect of receiving someone of another religion into their families. We asked:
People have different religions and different religious views. Would you accept a person from a different religion or with a very different religious view from yours … … marrying a relative of yours? … being a candidate of the political party you prefer?
Three-quarters of people in Britain would accept a person from a different religious background marrying a relative (Table 4 .12). But the level of definite acceptance in Britain is well below what one finds in the United States, where nearly nine in ten would accept mixed marriage. There are also marked variations between different religious groups. Roman Catholics in Britain come closest to the American pattern, with 80 per cent of them accepting mixed marriage. By contrast, only 60 per cent of non-Christians would accept it, while 26 per cent would definitely not, the highest proportion found across the different religious groups we surveyed. Differences between the religious and unreligious are fairly small; 73 per cent of the religious say they would accept mixed marriage, compared with 77 per cent of the unreligious. Replacing "marriage to a relative" with "being a candidate for office" makes little difference to the results, except that more people have no opinion. The transatlantic contrast -with religious difference seeming to be a larger obstacle in Britain, despite its lower religiosity -points to a problem. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
Attitudes towards different religious groups
We need to consider how far discontent with religious diversity reflects concern about particular religious groups. We asked respondents to express how they feel about people in various groups on a scale from 0 to 100, where 50 is neutral and higher or lower values represent "warm" or "cool" feelings respectively: The results are shown in Table 4 .13. Each column shows the percentage of people who give "cool", "neutral" or "warm" scores to each of seven different religious groups. Most groups attract more positive than negative feelings. Nearly half of respondents, for example, feel warmly towards Protestants, 44 per cent are neutral and only six per cent express cool feelings. Two groups stand out for attracting more negative than positive feelings: Muslims and (marginally) the deeply religious. A third of people give Muslims a cool rating, while under a quarter give them a warm one. Responses towards these two groups are related; two-thirds (66 per cent) of those who feel warmly towards
As an aside, there is considerable variation in how positively people feel about members of their own group. Nearly two-thirds of Muslims feel very warmly about other Muslims (rating them 76 or more out of 100), and likewise half (50 per cent) of Catholics are highly positive about their co-religionists. Only a quarter (25 per cent) of those with no religion feel so warmly about fellow nonaffiliates. The fact that people make distinctions between Muslims and the followers of other religions is also evident when we consider responses to two questions about the building of a local mosque or church. A random half of respondents were asked:
Suppose some Muslims wanted to build a large Muslim mosque in your community. Would this bother you a lot, bother you a little, not bother you, or be something you welcome?
The other half of respondents were asked: 7
Suppose some Christians wanted to build a large Christian church in your community. Would this bother you a lot, bother you a little, not bother you, or be something you welcome?
A majority (55 per cent) say that they would be bothered by the construction of a large Muslim mosque in their community, but only 15 per cent by a large church.
These concerns may be linked to perceptions of the extent to which Muslims want to integrate socially. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement "nearly all Muslims living in Britain really want to fit in", similar proportions agreed and disagreed (38 and 39 per cent respectively).
There is a clear relationship between negative attitudes towards Muslims and unease about religious difference. Among respondents with neutral or positive feelings towards Muslims, 62 per cent think that diversity has been good for Britain. Among those who have negative feelings for Muslims, exactly the same percentage disagree. A third of people (33 per cent) who deny that Muslims want to fit in -but only eight per cent of others -disagree with the view that all religious groups should have equal rights.
Similar attitudes towards religious diversity can be found among people who have negative feelings about other groups -Buddhists, for example -and one might therefore suppose that the figures show general anxiety about 'imported' religion rather than hostility to Muslims specifically. This interpretation is hard to sustain. First, far more people respond unfavourably to Muslims than to others. Second -and this is the crucial point -very few people are negative about any other group on its own. Of the people who feel cool towards Education has a clear impact on attitudes towards Muslims; 44 per cent of respondents with no qualifications have negative feelings, as against 23 per cent of those with degrees. Perhaps surprisingly, given the importance of education, there are no sharp age differences, although 18-24 year olds are less likely than people aged 65 and over to have negative feelings (34 and 41 per cent respectively). Religiosity makes little difference to the prevalence of negative feelings towards Muslims, but the religious are almost twice as likely as the unreligious (31 per cent versus 17 per cent) to express feelings that are positive rather than neutral.
Three key points emerge from this analysis. Firstly, some of the antipathy towards Muslims comes from people with a generalised dislike of anyone different. Secondly, a larger subset of the population -about a fifth -responds negatively only to Muslims. Finally, relatively few people feel unfavourable towards any other religious or ethnic group on its own.
Some degree of generalised xenophobia is always likely to exist. Conceivably there is a spill-over effect, so that people who are worried about Muslims come to feel negatively about 'others' in general. In any case, the adverse reaction to Muslims deserves to be the focus of policy on social cohesion, because no other group elicits so much disquiet.
When the feeling thermometer was used in the US General Social Survey in 2004, the ratings of Muslims were similar to those shown in Table 4 .13 (28 per cent cool, 36 per cent neutral, 26 per cent warm). In a relative sense the results were even less favourable, because more people than in Britain felt warmly about Protestants, Catholics and Jews (51, 52 and 45 per cent respectively). Americans are more accepting of religious difference, but not because they have less negative views about Muslims. We suggest that Americans appear to be more tolerant in part because religious diversity is central to their national identity and ideology, and also because Muslims are a much smaller and less visible minority in the US than in Britain.
Religion and freedom of expression
Support for the free expression of unpopular or potentially dangerous religious views is weak, particularly in Britain. The following question was asked on both sides of the Atlantic:
Consider religious extremists, people who believe that their religion is the only true faith and all other religions should be considered as enemies. Do you think such people should be allowed … … to hold a public meeting to express their views? … to publish books expressing their views?
As shown in Table 4 .14, only a quarter to a third of people in Britain would allow the meeting or book, as compared with more than half to three-quarters of Americans. It is difficult to be sure without further testing, but one wonders whether the term 'religious extremist' is interpreted in different ways in the two countries. In Britain it is almost certainly taken to refer to violent Islamists; in the US it might be thought by some to include sectarian Christian fundamentalists. This conjecture receives some support from the similarity in responses to questions that explicitly mention antagonistic Muslims. One can compare different but related questions in the two countries. In Britain, respondents were invited to agree or disagree with the view that:
People have a perfect right to give a speech defending Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda
Two-thirds (66 per cent) disagreed with this statement. In the US, people were asked to consider whether "a Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of the United States should be allowed to speak", to which a substantial majority (57 per cent) responded in the negative. While support for free expression still seems slightly higher in the US than in Britain, these scenarios suggest that the acceptable limits are not so different in the two countries and that attitudes towards Muslims are similar.
Further similarities can be found in relation to material that criticises or mocks religion. Take, for example, the following question: Here, too, more than a quarter (26 per cent) would remove an anti-religious book from libraries, and nearly as many (23 per cent) would not allow someone to speak in opposition to religion. The comparison may not be fair, of course, to the extent that Americans are more religious than the British and hence will tend to be more offended by anti-religious material. Religious people in Britain are much more likely to support a ban than the unreligious (38 per cent versus 17 per cent, with the religiously fuzzy in between).
Turning to religious expression, we asked half of our respondents:
Should people be allowed to dress in a way that shows their religious faith, by wearing veils, turbans or crucifixes?
Just over half (53 per cent) think that these symbols should be allowed, but 42 per cent say "no". Religiosity makes a difference; people who are unreligious or religiously fuzzy split fairly evenly on the issue, while 62 per cent of the religious would allow dress of this kind. We asked the other half of our sample a similar but more restricted question:
Should people who work with the general public be allowed to dress in a way that shows their religious faith, by wearing veils, turbans or crucifixes?
One might expect more people to respond negatively to this question than the other one, but in fact fewer people do so; only 30 per cent state categorically that religious dress should not be allowed in this situation, while 50 per cent would permit it.
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Conclusions
Britain and the United States might seem to be two countries separated by a common religion. Both are predominantly Protestant (in a broad sense, encompassing Anglicans), with sizable Catholic minorities and a leavening of non-Christians, but faith is far more vibrant in the New World than in the Old. It would be natural to suppose that attitudes towards religion are very different in the two countries. And if secularisation means the declining social significance of religion (Wilson, 1966) , we would expect religion not to matter much in Britain.
As it turns out, these assumptions are not wholly correct. Americans and Britons are surprisingly similar in many of their attitudes. Most people are pragmatic: religion has personal and social benefits, but faith should not be taken too far. From politics to private life, many domains are seen as off limits to clerical meddling. People are generally tolerant, but signs of inflexibility are most quickly encountered in Britain. The reason, we suggest, is the degree to which Islam is perceived as a threat to social cohesion.
American views about Muslims and particularly anti-Western clerics are just as hostile as those found across the Atlantic. What is different is that the proportion of Muslims in the population is seven times higher in Britain than in the United States and growing rapidly. In that respect the better parallel, as others have observed, is with American unease at the prevalence of Spanish speakers. Some of the reaction comes from people who feel negatively about 'others' in general, but a larger number of people in Britain are unfavourable only to Muslims. The size and visibility of this group, as well as suspicion of extremists, have made religion seem important again.
This apparent threat to national identity (or even, some fear, to security) reduces the willingness to accommodate free expression. Opinion is divided, and many people remain tolerant of unpopular speech as well as distinctive dress and religious behaviour, but a large segment of the British population is unhappy about these subcultures.
Of course, Muslims are still only a small fraction of the British population, and most people have relatively little contact with them. Ironically this separation may make the problem more acute, as what from close up would seem benign looks threatening at a distance. Religion is increasingly associated with unfamiliar people practising an unfamiliar faith. It is a faith that provokes anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic, and the fact that the vast majority of adherents are loyal and peace-loving is scant reassurance if a minority are not.
Suspicion of 'risky' religion may have an impact on rights to free expression. Likewise, the strong opinion that religion should be confined to the private sphere could be an obstacle to the integration of those who believe otherwise. In any event it is not clear whether religious dress, education, language, and so on count as private or public. How does one classify the use of officially recognised Sharia tribunals to settle family disputes? When identity is salient, the personal becomes political.
There is, to repeat, considerable toleration in Britain of religion as a private pursuit. Few people are hostile to religious practice per se. Indeed, we have an interest in anything that might make other people behave well, and some nostalgia for traditional religion lingers. Religion has come to be associated with unpopular things, however: Islamist extremism, immigrants, George Bush, preachy morality, child abuse. Despite their engagement in worthwhile activities, religious groups have shown little talent for public relations. God is back on the agenda, but the faithful may yet come to be wistful about the days of dull secularity. Unless otherwise stated, all US data reported in this chapter come from the General Social Survey. 2. Responses concerning religion are known to be highly influenced by the wording of the question, the options offered, the context in which it appears, social norms and other factors (Voas, 2007) . The 2001 Census elicited much higher levels of Christian identification (at the expense of 'no religion') for reasons that have been analysed elsewhere (Voas and Bruce, 2004 
